Security
Cradle handles two genuinely sensitive things: the credentials for accounts you operate, and the media you have not published yet. Here is how both are treated.
Two kinds of login, never mixed
Signing in to Cradle and signing an account into TikTok are unrelated systems. Your Cradle account is managed by a hosted identity provider. Social account credentials live in a separate secrets vault, with their own storage, permissions and audit trail. Neither can reach the other.
Social passwords are write-only to you
Once stored, a social password is never returned to a browser — not to an owner, not to an admin, not anywhere in the interface. It is released only to a Farm Agent that is actively running a sign-in job for that specific account, and every release is written to your activity log.
Media stays private
Uploads go straight from your browser into a private bucket with public access fully blocked. Nothing in it is ever made permanently readable. Both browsers and agents receive short-lived, single-purpose links that are generated on request and never stored.
Agents are machines, with machine credentials
A Farm Agent authenticates with its own scoped, revocable credential — not a user account. Registration uses a one-time, short-lived token that becomes invalid the moment it is exchanged. Only a hash of the credential is ever stored, and it is redacted from every log line.
Permissions are enforced on the server
Every request that touches workspace data proves membership and the required permission before anything happens. Hiding a button is a courtesy; the server check is the control.
What Cradle deliberately does not do
- It does not bypass CAPTCHAs or security challenges.
- It includes no anti-detection or platform-evasion features.
- It provides no way to access an account you were not given credentials for.
When a device hits a challenge, the job stops and asks for a person. That is the intended behaviour, not a limitation.